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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JULIE RIMENSBURGER,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 930384-CA

vs.
JOSEPH RIMENSBURGER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i)(1992).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether Defendant/Appellant, who, having been granted specific relief on
Appeal is now entitled to an award of more than what was specifically granted to
him by this Court's Order as interpreted by the District Court.
The relief granted Defendant was specifically set forth by this Court in it's
second amended unpublished opinion entered by this Court on the 6th day of
November 1992. The Court's specific language is as follows:

We therefore otder Wife's attorney to pay Husband only for those
reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred up to June 20, 1991,
the date the Trial Court entered its Order denying Husband's motion
to dismiss, but not for those fees and expenses incurred thereafter.
STATEMENT OF CASF
Defendant's appeal from an Order of the Thiid District Court prevailed in
this Court on the iss* 3 of jurisdiction. However, the original Order of the Court
was amended twice with J^e fin^1 opinion being issued November 6, 1992.
Although the issue of jurisdiction which was before the Court was never modified,
this Court entered two (2) modifications of its award of expenses and fees to
Defendant, each amended Order reducing the award of expenses and fees. After
the second amended Order, the case was remanded to the District Court with
instruction to a) dismiss Plaintiff's Petition for Modification, and b) award
Defendant his reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred up to June 20, 1991,
but denying Defendant any expenses or attorney fees which he incurred after June
20, 1991. There was no language in the final Order either awarding Defendant
hio costs or denying an award of those costs to Defendant.
Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion with the District Court for an Order
awarding him his reasonable attorney fee% expenses and costs. Both parties filed
memoranda in support of their positions. The District Court, Judge Wilkinson
2

presiding, awarded Defendant expenses arid attorney fees for all of the work done
by Defendant's attorney not only up to June 20, 1991, but for an additional onehalf (1/2) hour which Defendant's attorney spent after June 20, 1991, in preparing
written Orders reflecting the Court's Order entered June 20, 1991.

Judge

Wilkinson awarded Defendant his entire request for attorneys fees in spite of the
fact that the issue of jurisdiction was only a part of the total task Defendant's
attorney had in responding to Plaintiff's Petition to Modify. Judge Wilkinson then
denied Defendant's request for costs on appeal of some $197.00. His denial of
any award of Defendant's costs was based on the fact that this Court was silent as
to the issue of costs in this Court's Order of November 6, 1992. From that denial
of costs, Defendant has brought the current appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as stated by Defendant are essentially correct. After receiving
Defendant's motion for the award of expenses, attorney fees and costs, the Third
District Court, Judge Wilkinson, interpreted this Court's second amended Order
of November 6, 1992, awarding expenses and attorney fees, but denying
Defendant's request for costs because the language of this Court's specific Order
was silent as to whether costs should be awarded or not.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Whether Defendant was or was not entitled to an award of his costs on
appeal is a matter based on the intent of this Court at the time it entered it's Order
of November 6, 1992, and of whether or not Judge Wilkinson correctly interpreted
that Order.

In either case, the confusion will easily be resolved by a simple

clarification of that point by this Court.
POINT II
Plaintiffs attorney did not violate Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees as requested.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Rule 34(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is as follows:
Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law,
if an appeal J > dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant
unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant
unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs
shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a
judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed
or taxed in a criminal case. (Emphasis added)
4

While Rule 34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure appears clear i c ises
where the Court has reversed a lower Court's Judgment or Order, it alsc n ikes
provision in the second to the last sentence of that rule that where a Judgn ent has
been modified or reversed in part, costs shall be allowed only as ordi re b / the
Court.
While the original Judgment of the District Court on the issue of jurisdiction
was reversed, the Order of this Court, with respect to the award of expenses and
attorney fees, was modified twice. Such a modification has the effect of requiring
this Court to specifically award costs on appeal.
The possibility of confusion with respect to the applicability of the various
provisions of Rule 34 coupled with the rather specific language of this Court's
Order of November 6, 1992, which denied fees and expenses incurred after June
20, 1991, and the fact that the November Order was silent as to the issue of costs
apparently led to Judge Wilkinson's order denying Defendant his costs.
Due to the cut off date for the award of expenses and fees listed in this
Court's Order, Judge Wilkinson could reasonably have interpreted that to limit all
costs, fees and expenses unless specifically awarded.
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t is clear that w hether or not Judge Wilkinson interpreted this Court's Order
propei y ir improperly the intent of this Court can and will be made clear by this
Court.
POINT II
Plaintiff's argument to (he Trial Court with respect to the issue of costs on
appeal is sustainable on at least two (2) grounds. First, the language of Rule 34
in the last phrase of the first sentence it states "If a Judgment or Order is affirmed
or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the Court".
While it is true that the issue on appeal was not reversed in part, the portion of the
Court's Order with respect to the award of attorneys fees awaided to Defendant
was reversed and modified twice. Such a modification of the Court's Order could
reasonably lead to a requirement that an award of costs should have been
specifically stated in the Court's Order.
Secondly, the specific cut off date with respect to the award of attorneys fees
and expenses could also reasonably have been interpreted to prohibit the Trial
Court from awarding costs on appeal which were most certainly incurred following
the cut off date stated in the Order.
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Plaintiffs counsel did not violate Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure by suggesting reasonable alternatives for the Court's consideration in
the interpretation of this Court's Order which was silent as to the issue of costs on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
The issue of Judge Wilkinson's interpretation of Rule 34 and/or of his
interpretation of this Court's Order of November 6, 1992, is a matter that will be
resolved by this Court making it's intentions clear as to the award of costs an
appeal in the previous appeal.
Defendant's request for sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs attorney
are improper for the reason that Plaintiffs arguments to the Court were reasonable
and not a per se violation of Rule 11.
Respectfully submitted,

Lynn JT Qark- /(
Attorney ror Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFIC VTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Z?tf Tlay of January, 1994, two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Mr. Wendell P. Abies, Attorney for Defendant/Appel' mt, 536 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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Thiro Judicial District
W e n d e l l P . A b i e s , B a r No. 11
Attorney for Defendant
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-7424
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JULIE RIMENSBURGER,
FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 915900078MI
JOSEPH RIMENSBURGER,
Judge Homer F, Wilkinson
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees along
with payment of a cost bill was submitted to the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial
Administration, and the court being fully advised in the premises,
now makes and enters the following findings:
FINDINGS
1.

That the hourly rate, amount of fees and preparing a

court order of June 20, 1991 after that date is a proper charge.
2.

The court of appeals was silent in the awarding of

cost of appeal against the Plaintiff and therefore this court will
leave the matter for the Court of Appeals.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

That

Defendant

is

awarded

a

judgment

Plaintiff for attorney's fees in the sum of $487.50.
2.

Costs on appeal are hereby denied.

against

Dated this

/'

day of April, 1993.

/HOMER F. WILKINSON
/ District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the *ut^

day of April, 1993, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit for
Decision was mailed, postage prepaid, to Lynn J. Clark, Attorney
for Plaintiff, 935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D-102, Midvale,
Utah 84047.
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